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Law/Text/Past 
Steven Wilf* 
How might legal historians read text? What is particular about their modes of reading as 
opposed to those employed by readers in other disciplines? This essay will analyze the distinctive 
features of legal texts such as those stemming from the pervasive reliance upon conventions or 
boilerplate as part of a bricolage construction, the focus upon legitimizing gestures to official 
authority, and the normative, almost instrumental nature of many legal texts. While other sorts 
of texts might be more expressive, statutes, for example, always include a sanction. Drawing 
upon numerous examples, the paper identifies an expansive array of texts, including extra-official 
legalism; rituals, procedure, and nonverbal texts; and imagined law. While seeking to provide 
sharp, analytic definitions of what is a legal text, it will forge a path somewhere between 
establishing a new dichotomy of text/context and, alternatively, proclaiming that everything is 
text (il n’y a pas de hors-texte). Without making a fetish of the problem of reading, I 
underscore the ways text might be chimerical, indeterminate, multivocal, slippery, and generally 
untrustworthy. Text has come to mean too much and too little. 
Let me make clear what this paper is not about—it is not a guide to literary techniques 
for reading, a meandering meditation on the craft of history, or a manifesto for the importance of 
close readings. But I will situate the problem of text reading in our own historiographic milieu as 
legal historians. It is not simply the breakdown of the binary construct of law/society that leads to 
a more self-conscious understanding of how to read a legal historical text. Legal history is 
particularly subject to a postmodern sensibility, which erodes interdisciplinary borders, 
jurisdictional boundaries, and divisions between official and extra-official justice, and which 
contributes to disintermediation and the loss of the interpretive monopolies of professional elites. 
What is the role of the legal historian in this new world? 
 
 
  
 
* Joel Barlow Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development, 
University of Connecticut School of Law; Microsoft Fellow in Law, Property, and the Economic 
Organization of Society, Program in Law and Public Affairs, Princeton University. This Essay has 
been read too many times by Christopher Tomlins and, at this point, not at all by Robert W. Gordon. 
Nevertheless, it reflects conversations over long stretches of time with both of these scholars. I 
appreciate their many insights. In addition, I am grateful to the participants of the UC Irvine School 
of Law symposium “‘Law As . . .’: Theory and Method in Legal History” (April 16–17, 2010). Richard 
Ross commented upon an early draft of this essay. 
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Janus must surely be the patron deity of legal historians. For even when we 
attempt to free ourselves from the awkward, increasingly unworkable framework 
of law and society, we find ourselves facing a new binary construct of text and 
context. This Essay is about how legal historians have come to define themselves 
through a fraught relationship with text. It examines the enticement of thinking of 
text as a separate sphere apart from the realia of circumstances, aloof from its 
readers and users, and—if one can still use the term in this posteverything age—as 
superstructure. Text has captivated scholars because it is inherently unstable and 
because it so neatly serves as the counterpoint, the dramatic foil of context. This 
essay is a brief excursus into the problems posed by text as a subject of inquiry, 
the difficulty of conceiving of text deeply embedded in its social context, and a 
proposal that our reading of text should lean toward our lawyerly, purposeful 
understanding of language as a normative site rather than our historian’s 
conception of language as documentary—a cultural artifact that survives across 
time. 
Legal historians have a long, complex relationship with text. In many ways, 
legal historians are a subspecies of intellectual historians, specialized readers of 
particular mandarin texts such as cases and statutes. While this description is 
certainly rather limited and cannot describe their varied activities today, legal 
historians often resort to claims that they can read certain texts with technical skill. 
Legal historians purport to know the precise usage of terms of art. They purport 
to distinguish, for example, between the magic words of one form of pleading 
under the writ system and those of another. Although these texts are not always so 
arcane, the focus on reading is a rather old-fashioned assertion of a guild 
monopoly directed toward mainstream historians, which surprisingly still often 
works. For nonhistorian colleagues in law faculties, however, we turn our other 
face toward context. We stake our authority upon knowing the period, deeply 
situating law in the particularities of a specific time and place.  
These two faces are presented at different moments and to different 
audiences—historians and lawyers—and therefore some historians of law have 
become as comfortable in shifting, dual identity as any minority group. While 
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there are those who put the accent mark on the first half of the phrase, “legal,” 
and others who consider themselves truly part of the historical fraternity, most 
legal historians are simply artful dodgers of one sort or another. This is not 
surprising since so often legal historians have embraced what Henry Louis Gates 
calls a “two-toned” approach for strategic reasons.1 To use a Chicago metaphor, 
this demands navigating down the Midway, alternating between text and context, 
between claims of expertise made upon legal text and claims made upon social 
knowledge, between a law school on one side of the windswept, difficult-to-cross 
divide, and the contextual scholars in the social science faculties on the other.   
But this is not the first time legal historians have taken this path. Before text 
and context, there was a similar binary: law and society. The law and society 
dichotomy is deeply rooted in the kind of academic strategies legal historians 
employ. Moreover, it fits the neutral politics often inhabited by historians’ “noble 
dream” of objectivity and a lawyerly distaste for dogmatism.2 When examining 
legal texts, historians could operate within the boundaries set by ordinary doctrinal 
analysis. However, the contextual approach, represented by the law and society 
movement had a comfortable relationship to mid-twentieth-century “end of 
ideology” ideologies. As Michael Grossberg has argued, the Wisconsin School of 
legal history, the Ur-practitioners of legal history grounded in the law and society 
movement, embraced a “historically coherent view of law as a rational instrument 
that could be seized upon by members of the dominant middle class to achieve 
consensual economic goals.”3 Its interest in private ordering, empirical social 
science method, and functionalism often reflected a belief that social forces could 
be easily cabined into sensible categories. 
It is remarkable how long these hollow boxes, law and society, have 
remained with us. Frayed, rusty, and somewhat dilapidated, this model continued 
to stand partly because of its usefulness in carving out a respectable role for legal 
historians and partly because there was no sense of what might take its place. As 
Robert Gordon pointed out, there always remains a conceptual problem for those 
who see the world as divided between two separate spheres, law and society—“to 
work out the secret of that relationship.”4 Secrets can be compelling.5   
This essay focuses upon a different sort of relationship—the role of the legal 
historian as an interested reader of text. I emphatically, however, do not want to 
construct a reader/text or a text/context dichotomy. Any discussion of legal 
 
1. HENRY LOUIS GATES JR., THE SIGNIFYING MONKEY: A THEORY OF AFRO-AMERICAN 
LITERARY CRITICISM, at ix–xviii (1988). 
2. PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE “OBJECTIVITY QUESTION” AND THE 
AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION (1988). 
3. Michael Grossberg, Social History Update: “Fighting Faiths” and the Challenges of Legal History, 25 
J. SOC. HIST. 191, 191 (1991). 
4. Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 60 (1984). 
5. On the compelling nature of secrets, see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, PRIVATE LIVES 
(2004). 
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historians interrogating text should not replace one shopworn form of dualism 
with another. After all the binary paradigms—such as law/society or law-in-the-
books/law-in-action—why add another? It does not seem to matter the source of 
these constructions: passé late nineteenth-century historicism (primitive/modern), 
liberal (status/contract), Marxist (base/superstructure), reconstructed Marxist 
thinking influenced by the historicism of the Past and Present school 
(patrician/plebe), or identity-based critical studies (insider/outsider), there is 
always some binary lurking in the background, which can be plucked out of 
obscurity and turned into the legal historical methodological approach du jour. At 
a time when we have witnessed the crumbling of the old binary distinctions, which 
defined scholarly thinking, from sic et non to elite and popular culture, it should 
come as no surprise that dualism is not a terribly attractive approach. 
The goals of this Essay are fairly modest. It seeks to identify the relationship 
of legal historians to text. How do we explain the fact that text is of essential 
importance to legal historians and at the same time underexamined? First, as 
mentioned earlier, legal historians strategically shift back and forth between text 
and context, and never very thickly probe either category. Second, the very 
prevalence of text makes it less visible. Text is a precondition of legal historical 
study and is like water for fish—a milieu to be navigated rather than interrogated. 
Third, text itself is a maddeningly inexact construct. Jacques Derrida once 
famously declared “il n’y a pas de hors-texte”6—there is nothing outside the text. It is 
an expressive container for holding ideas, a discrete set of symbols, and a fluid, 
uncontainable part of a much larger fabric. In this sense, a text is a social 
construction, an agreed upon subject.  
Fourth, text is the locus of interpretation. A text is what we call a text for the 
purposes of analysis. This might be an easy definition, a kind of textual positivism. 
But where does it take us? Legal historians cut and reshape texts to fit their 
purposes, tailoring its dimensions to their needs. A text might be small—a 
statutory fragment—or long, rambling case, but there is always a decision being 
made about how to identify its size, boundaries, and contours. After a nip and 
tuck, a text always better fits a historical argument. Fifth, the very mutability and 
silences of the text deny interpretation. This point was made by Walter Benjamin. 
The term text comes from the Latin word textum, which means a woven cloth. It is 
woven as part of a much larger, more elusive pattern of remembrance and 
forgetting. According to Benjamin, the mother of text is Penelope: “the day 
unravels what the night has woven. When we awake each morning, we hold in our 
hands, usually weakly and loosely, but a few fringes of the carpet.”7  
 Legal historians are therefore as much the producers of text as the readers 
 
6. JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 158 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans., 1998) 
7. 2 WALTER BENJAMIN, On the Image of Proust, in SELECTED WRITINGS, 1927–1934, at 237, 
238 (Michael W. Jennings et al. eds., 1999). 
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of text. But, at the same time, they are subject to its vagaries. This Essay seeks to 
identify both the power of legal historians over text and the numerous ways they 
are subject to the text’s own demands. The relationship between legal historian 
and text, therefore, is not an easy hooking up—but a troubled, complex 
association that must be examined from the point of view of defining texts, and 
which changes over time. My focus will be upon ourselves—the historian at work 
doing what he or she does best, that is, providing temporality—rather than upon 
the text unmoored from time. Historians have a special gift of looking backward.8 
But after utilizing the gift of rearview vision, they must also decide—like 
Cassandra with her prophecy—what this vision might mean for contemporaries. 
I will not offer any simple answers to the problems of texts. Indeed, the 
reader can quietly exit stage left, if he or she expects a straightforward 
methodological toolbox, the next big paradigm, or a primer on the heuristic, the 
exegetical, or the casuistic. This is not one of those bright yellow books found in 
the local college bookstore: Gadamer or Derrida for Dummies. Nor am I ready to 
concede with a simple gesture. Indeed, it is simplest to state what this essay is not. 
It is not a methodological guidebook, not a taxonomy of different sorts of modes 
of reading, not a celebration of the historian’s métier, not a glimpse of the 
possibilities posed by borrowing tools from neighboring disciplines, not a 
historiographic essay, and not a manifesto—though I may slip into any of these 
genres for a few awkward moments. I would like to avoid the shopworn clichés of 
interpretive communities, representation, and the trial as either a performative 
drama with its roots in primitive ordeal by combat or as a cultural tableau vivant 
where the social fissures, differences, and contentions might be enacted. 
The Essay is organized into four broad sections. Part I, What Might Be a 
Legal Text?, probes the possibilities and difficulties inherent in defining a text. It 
addresses many of the problems we have identified: the mutability of text, its 
porous boundaries, its enigmatic nature, and its self-contradictions. Must a text 
have an author? How should texts be read? Are legal texts different from other 
texts? It examines the way lawyers have imposed discipline on such chimerical 
documents, insisting that reading texts be a closely controlled craft that excludes 
alternative meanings as well as raising possibilities. The Strange Career of Legal 
Textualism, Part II, asks why legal historians have failed to explore the 
technologies of textual interpretation. This is especially puzzling in light of 
mainstream historians’ preoccupation with issues of methodology. In this section 
of the paper, I offer a brief excursus in the sociology of knowledge for legal 
history. The avoidance of theory, methodology, and the heuristic turn is very 
much a part of how legal historians positioned themselves in the late twentieth-
 
8. WILLIAM H. SEWELL JR., LOGICS OF HISTORY: SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL 
TRANSFORMATION 81–85 (2005). 
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century legal academy. I also trace some of the promising roads not taken. 
Historical jurisprudence at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the 
twentieth centuries might have curbed its impulse toward the folklorist readings of 
law and developed a full-bodied sense of the variety of legal cultures. Even more 
notably, legal history was originally included by legal realists in the array of 
disciplines with normative purchase. How did legal historians miss engaging in 
either historical jurisprudence’s excavation of culture or legal realism’s turn toward 
the normative at a critical moment in the early twentieth century? 
Part III, A Short Dictionary of Misunderstood Legal Historical Terms, is 
based on Kundera’s insight that lexicons might be constructed around sites of 
contention. It examines a series of phrases, which I hope might serve to open up 
the discussion of alternative historical methods. I chose to employ this sort literary 
device because of my discomfort either with a straightforward and limited set of 
methodological approaches or with the polemical tone of many historiographic 
studies. The Dictionary is intended to be illustrative, but not limiting, of 
alternative approaches to writing legal history. Part IV, Blake’s Telescope, is a final 
meditation upon the optics of text reading. It argues that the way out of the 
dilemma of how legal historians should respond to texts may reside in the 
commonplace lawyerly ideal of identifying texts as bridges between the many 
possible readings of law and those with real normative power. Thinking about the 
normative meaning of legal texts emerges not simply from the external pressure of 
the law academy, but from the embedded purposeful rhetoric of the legal texts 
themselves. 
I. WHAT MIGHT BE A LEGAL TEXT? 
A. Sickness unto Text 
Just as Victorian women might experience bouts of neurasthenia, 
historians—and legal historians are not immune—suffer from the close relative of 
a peculiar malady identified by Jacques Derrida: archive fever. What is archive 
fever?  
It is to burn with a passion. It is never to rest, interminably, from 
searching for the archive right where it slips away. It is to run after the 
archive, even if there’s too much of it, right where something in it 
anarchives itself. It is to have compulsive, repetitive, and nostalgic desire 
for the archive, an irrepressible desire to return to the origin, 
homesickness, nostalgia for the return to the most archaic place of 
absolute commencement.9  
The archive simultaneously preserves and hides the past. 
 
9. JACQUES DERRIDA, ARCHIVE FEVER: A FREUDIAN IMPRESSION 91 (Eric Prenowitz 
trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1996) (1995). 
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Is there such a disease as sickness from text as Derrida characterized mal de 
texte much as Derrida described mal d’archive? No doubt, legal historians race after 
texts in the fashion Derrida describes. The text promises to explain the reasons 
behind larger institutional or doctrinal changes, to unveil psychological postures, 
to demonstrate what we intuitively suspect is actually true. Yet almost every text is 
a disappointment. It insufficiently informs, lacks authority, or is incomplete. Text 
is chimerical, indeterminate, multivocal, slippery, and generally untrustworthy. 
And what is not a text? Text has come to mean too much and too little. It is the 
object of study, but it also serves as the conditions of communication.  
The encounter between the legal historian and the text is fraught with 
danger. Texts often slip out of our hands. By the term mal, Derrida meant 
misfortune or disquiet as much as fever—as it is often translated.10 The anxieties 
of text reading affect some scholars more than others. For historians, moreover, 
there is an overheated pursuit, particular to their calling, for examining the shards 
of evidence, the fragments of text from historical actors is one of the few ways 
that the past can be reconstructed. Text fever is a kind of occupational disease. 
Legal historians spend their lives in a quest looking for smoking-gun texts—the 
writings or historical actors that exquisitely reveal the blend of motive, guile, and 
self-consciousness, which is not merely revealed by actions. This is what Michelet 
called “the exhumation of their deepest desires.”11 But texts, like lovers, rarely turn 
out to be everything we imagine. Indeed, even if the text was illuminating, even 
confessional, it will inevitably expose its own lacunae. 
In some ways, knowing the etiology of this disease is helpful. It spares us 
sliding down the rabbit holes of heuristic thinking. We cannot master the 
slipperiness of our ever-elusive texts, we cannot flee our text for context, and we 
cannot ever tie ourselves to the masts in order to be preserved from the sirens of 
multiple interpretations. Strikingly, we pretend that we have interpretive power. 
Our metaphors tell us a great deal about how we deal with texts in general—and 
all of them do not quite fit a legal text. Texts might be dissected (we “murder to 
dissect”12), unpacked like a portmanteau, or become an ocular instrument as we 
search for their deeper meanings.  
But Derrida points us in a different direction—where we look inward toward 
the psyche of those searching for the past. In a sense, we are—in the delirium of 
our fevers—the creator and preserver of documents. A text is something we work 
upon while a document is something we create. Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, 
and Julia Kristeva have all pointed out that texts are multivocal, speaking to each 
 
10. CAROLYN STEEDMAN, DUST: THE ARCHIVE AND CULTURAL HISTORY 9 (Rutgers Univ. 
Press 2002) (2001). 
11. Id. at 38. 
12. WILLIAM WORDSWORTH, The Tables Turned, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF WILLIAM 
WORDSWORTH 573, 573 (1998). 
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other like crickets on a summer evening.13 The instability and chimerical character 
of texts is implicit to the text itself because no text can ever be disentangled from 
others. If a text cannot be anything more than a crossroad of other texts, if the 
reader is critical for making the text unified by seeing, then, perhaps, we should 
turn to the reader, the legal historian, to speak of a relationship between reader 
and text rather than the text itself.14 
B. Text and Difference 
Legal texts are different—and therefore they must be read differently. As 
Brook Thomas has pointed out, “without a doubt legal texts can have literary 
qualities. But in the last analysis their function is different.”15 Legal texts are often 
intentionally derivative, moving forward across time through constantly gesturing 
toward commonly accepted terms of art. Such texts seek to be exclusive, limiting 
alternative interpretive challenges to authority—and making claims to being 
closely reasoned and inevitable in their conclusions; and, above all, legal language 
is an instrument, a technology of power. It is impossible to read Robert Cover’s 
Nomos and Narrative—which underscores the literary quality of legal texts—without 
the curative reminder of Violence and the Word, which tells us that behind every 
legal word lurks a threat. Law plays on a “field of pain and death.”16 
What makes an official legal text different? First, its authorial voice might be 
institutional (congressional history or legislative intent) rather than simply the 
voice of the single romantic author. The ventriloquist-like imposition of authorial 
intent upon the text is a cottage industry of sorts, legislative history, legislative 
history, which is often so flimsy that its artificial reason is often exposed. Second, 
the text is often a pastiche, a bricolage of terms from prior texts. Lawyers borrow 
shamelessly from each other. Indeed, the conservative use of language, pushing 
words forward through time, is a particularly notable aspect of lawyerly writing. 
Legal terms of art create well-traveled causeways between one text and another. 
But, more importantly, the similarity of texts created by using boilerplate or 
conservatively retained legal language suggests that intertextual readings—reading 
one text against another—must be an even more insistent task of the legal 
 
13. See ELIZABETH A. CLARK, HISTORY, THEORY, TEXT: HISTORIANS AND THE LINGUISTIC 
TURN 130–38 (2004). Some of these issues have been addressed in a very fine essay addressed to legal 
historians. See William W. Fisher III, Texts and Contexts: The Application to American Legal History of the 
Methodologies of Intellectual History, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1997). 
14. My thinking here has been influenced by Philip Hamburger’s excellent, and certainly 
unpostmodern, study in LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY (2008), which reconfigures judicial review as a 
relationship of duties and cultural sensibilities owed by the judge. What are the duties of a legal 
historian? 
15. Brook Thomas, Reflections on the Law and Literature Revival, 17 CRITICAL INQUIRY 510, 533 
(1991). 
16. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986). On law as a technology 
of power, see CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, FREEDOM BOUND (2010). 
Assembled_Issue_3 v5 (Do Not Delete) 2/22/2012  9:07 AM 
2011] LAW/TEXT/PAST 551 
 
historian.  
Third, legal texts are always texts seeking to limit the reader. They privilege 
one reading over another as more authoritative, more correct. Legal texts are 
always telling us like well-functioning signage not to take a particular doctrinal 
path, not to be misled by compelling arguments set forth by advocates that might 
lead us in a direction that will not be accepted as normative. If all texts have some 
limiting function for meaning—words are fences of a sort—then legal texts with 
their demands for interpretive exclusivity are particularly notable for the 
boundaries they place upon imaginative readings of alternative possibilities. 
Alternatives must always be justified. The art of distinguishing the case is what 
allows one to read a judicial decision differently from another. Fourth, as has been 
suggested, legal texts are instrumental texts. If, as Jackson Lears has written, “all 
history is the history of longing,”17 then all interrogations of legal historical texts 
are forms of pleading. 
II. THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL TEXTUALISM 
American legal history seems to have come of age. It has a multivolume 
history of the country’s leading judicial institution, the Holmes Devise history of 
the Supreme Court.18 Two massive encyclopedias have been published in the past 
few years. One, The Cambridge History of Law in America, is temporal, truly 
historiographic, in its scope, excavating the long nineteenth century. The other, 
The Oxford International Encyclopedia of Legal History, is itself a nineteenth-century 
artifact. It takes on the classic nineteenth-century comparative law project by 
cataloging the varieties of legal historical experience across the globe.19 In 
nineteenth-century historical Wissenschaft fashion, The Oxford International 
Encyclopedia of Legal History encompasses the “great” and “major” legal traditions 
from China to English Common Law. A new biographic dictionary identifies 
important figures, while an older work, The Founders’ Constitution, makes our 
constitutional canon into something truly canonical—a text with a genealogical 
commentary on the same page.20 Legal historians have brought the Constitution 
into the glossator tradition by scribbling along the margins comments, notes, and 
sources.21 Moreover, the field has its own canonical works, in the areas of both 
 
17. JACKSON LEARS, REBIRTH OF A NATION: THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 1877–
1920, at 1 (2009). 
18. 1–12 THE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (Paul A. Freund 
& Stanley N. Katz eds., 1971–2006). 
19. THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA (Michael Grossberg & Christopher 
Tomlins eds., 2008); THE OXFORD INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL HISTORY (Stanley 
N. Katz ed., 2009). 
20. See generally The FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 
1987); THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009). 
21. THE ANNOTATED U.S. CONSTITUTION AND DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (Jack 
N. Rakove ed., 2009). 
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overarching narrative and a methodological critique, which can be emulated and 
serve as the foil for disagreement. In a certain fashion, legal history embodies the 
Enlightenment project—encyclopedic surveys of knowledge—and the Romantic 
project—making and unmaking paradigms.  
In 1960, there were only five legal historians operating in elite law schools 
while today legal historians are considered an essential part of the infield of any 
major law school. Christopher Tomlins’s recent examination of the American 
Association of Law School faculty suggests that nearly five hundred legal academy 
professors identify legal history as a major subject interest.22 Princeton’s history 
department has its own distinguished chair in the field, the Class of 1921 
Bicentennial Professor of the History of American Law and Liberty.23  
Not surprisingly, legal historians are in a celebratory mood.24 As with any 
successful discipline, legal history has fragmented into schools representing 
different approaches: Stanford and Wisconsin law schools reflect a long-standing 
law and society tradition that is rooted in the empirical social sciences; Yale—
under the nuanced guidance of Robert Cover and Robert Gordon—has produced 
legal cultural history. Without a law school, Princeton’s Hendrik Hartog has 
encouraged a particular focus on the role of the strategies of ordinary people 
within legal frameworks. His own writings have accomplished the miracle of 
Birnam Wood by converting Willard Hurst’s deep forests filled with trees into 
people constantly on the move for legal answers to the puzzling predicaments of 
neighborly disagreements, family strife, and the deep psychological desire for 
heirs. Harvard Law School, as always, has focused on whatever Harvard thinks is 
important. A professional organization hosts yearly conferences with devoted 
attendees who regularly travel to its meetings. A succession of first-rate 
conferences has marked rites of passage for its most senior scholars. And legal 
history even has the ultimate sign of coming-of-age for any discipline: a web site 
to trumpet its latest accomplishments.25 
But I hesitate to join the huzzahs celebrating disciplinary triumphalism. 
 
22. Chris Tomlins, Legal History in U.S. Law Schools, LEGAL HIST. BLOG (Nov. 1, 2010, 5:55 
PM), http://legalhistoryblog.blogspot.com/2010/11/legal-history-in-us-law-schools.html; see also 
William J. Novak, Constitutional Theology: The Revival of Whig History in American Public Law, 2010 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 623, 624. G. Edward White describes the formative period for United States legal history 
at Harvard in The Origins of Modern American Legal History, in 2 TRANSFORMATION IN AMERICAN 
LEGAL HISTORY: LAW, IDEOLOGY, AND METHODS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MORTON J. HORWITZ 
48 (Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2010). 
23. For a discussion of the emergence of legal history as a field at Princeton University, see 
my conversation with Stanley N. Katz, which will be published in Law and History Review. 
24. Charles Donahue Jr., Whither Legal History?, in 1 TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN 
LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PROFESSOR MORTON J. HORWITZ 327 (Daniel W. 
Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2009).  
25. LEGAL HIST. BLOG, http://legalhistoryblog.blogspot.com/index.html (last visited May 
30, 2011). Recent major conferences honoring leading U.S. legal historians include those dedicated to 
Lawrence Friedman, Morton Horwitz, Stanley Katz, and William Nelson. 
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Thick tomes did not prevent nineteenth-century Protestant theology from turning 
into an intellectual dinosaur. While legal historians often have claimed to be most 
comfortable with fellow historians, their connection has frayed as the larger 
historical academy has experienced new trends. The turn toward narrative makes 
historical study look remarkably nonanalytic—the antithesis of the lawyerly focus 
on crisp intellectual maneuvering among texts. Identity history has placed gender, 
race, and class at the core of historical studies. Legal historians, on the other hand, 
still often think about law as a reified category aloof from identity politics, 
beginning sentences with phrases such as “the law conceives . . . .” A brooding 
omnipresence in the sky does not have a skin tone. The straightjacket of national 
jurisdictions, most significantly, has made legal historians seem fixed upon rigid 
national boundaries at the very moment that mainstream historians are probing 
the plasticity, elasticity, and permeability of territories.26 When was the last time 
that a subaltern has made a cameo appearance in an important legal historical 
monograph? If the new cultural history has often meant a history embodied—
shifting the gaze to bodies as the object of sex and death, pleasure and identity—
legal historians have been curiously disembodied.27 
Legal historians, in other words, have been left behind by other historians. 
Legal historians are borrowers from borrowers. As intellectual magpies traveling 
from nest to nest, they occasionally bring methodologies borrowed from other 
areas of scholarship to bear upon their own legal historical enquiries. When was 
the last time someone borrowed from us? We inherit derivative methodologies, 
and often remain uncritical of our own historiographic preconceptions. How 
many legal historians simply follow cases one after another like beads on a rosary 
until they reach a believable conclusion that this is the past? Much legal historical 
work is of the headnote tradition—cases simply represent holdings—which, in 
turn, represent the slow accretion of legal doctrines. In some ways, while we claim 
the mantle of historians—even if our heads are sometimes insufficiently anointed 
with the dust of archives—the fact is that among historians we are provincials. 
Moreover, as I suggested at the beginning, the tilt toward the historical 
academy rather than the legal has left us with the worst of both worlds. We are 
often insufficiently archival, poorly attuned to methodological concern. As the 
 
26. Exceptions include Christopher Tomlins, In a Wilderness of Tigers: Violence, the Discourse of 
English Colonizing and the Refusals of American History, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRY L. 451, 505–43 (2003); 
LAUREN BENTON, A SEARCH FOR SOVEREIGNTY: LAW AND GEOGRAPHY IN EUROPEAN EMPIRES 
1400–1900 (2009). The “straightjacket of national jurisdictions” is borrowed (with modification) from 
GEORGES DUBY, L’ÉCONOMIE RURALE ET LA VIE DES CAMPAGNES DANS L’OCCIDENT MÉDIÉVAL 
(1962). 
27. On embodiment, see Miri Rubin, What is Cultural History Now?, in WHAT IS HISTORY 
NOW? 80, 83 (David Cannadine ed., 2002); Patricia O’Brien, Michel Foucault’s History of Culture, in THE 
NEW CULTURAL HISTORY 25, 34 (Lynn Hunt ed., 1989). For a critique of these directions in the 
history academy, see JONATHAN CLARK, OUR SHADOWED PRESENT: MODERNISM, 
POSTMODERNISM, AND HISTORY (2004). 
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dealers in a particular kind of text, we are often detached from other aspects of a 
historical period to be proper contextualists. The textual turn, as I have argued, 
cannot provide an escape path since it is simply the latest enunciation of a new 
historical methodology, each of which has ultimately proved to be a révolution 
manquée—a revolution that did not happen. Or, perhaps, a better image might be a 
banana republic coup. The radio station is seized; a colonel in neatly pressed 
camouflage fatigues issues a statement about the failures of the old regime and 
makes overstated promises about what will come in its place. It is all very 
dramatic. In the end, however, this change in regime also fails. These are all 
reasons to rethink our identity. All the faux theory in the world will not make us 
“real historians.”28 Nevertheless, as I will argue in Part IV, we have retreated from 
the normative task of lawyers—and, I believe, this is the side of our identity that 
offers the most promising possibilities.  
But our law academy legacy also has its limits. It is striking that there are 
almost no autobiographies of law professors.29 The legal profession, and especially 
the legal academy with its focus on performative pedagogy, does not favor the 
cultivation of internality. Even when lawyers were influenced by reading ancient 
classics, they gravitated to Ciceronian rhetoric rather than Stoic self-examination. 
In contrast, numerous fine memoirs of historians have been written.30 Historians 
are inclined to this genre for a variety of reasons: to create a document for a future 
generation of historians, to situate their themes within the larger intellectual and 
political currents of their times, to apprentice a next generation of scholars 
through the telling of a Bildungsroman—the how-I-became-a-historian genre. 
Nevertheless, what is striking is that the degree of self-regard, inner-
consciousness, awareness, and attunement to psychological postures, knowing the 
deeper aspects of the personality referred to by the French as labyrinthe intérieur—
call it what you will—seems notably lacking among lawyers. Legal historians seem 
to share this outer-directedness. What might remedy this situation? Short of 
 
28. This phrase is borrowed from Joan Scott. See BECOMING HISTORIANS 51 (James M. 
Banner, Jr., & John R. Gillis eds., 2009). 
29. The exception is ELYN R. SAKS, THE CENTER CANNOT HOLD: MY JOURNEY THROUGH 
MADNESS (2007). But this is the exception that proves the rule. It is part of a genre of works 
describing the struggle with psychiatric illness, including KAY JAMISON, AN UNQUIET MIND (1995), 
and WILLIAM STYRON, DARKNESS VISIBLE: A MEMOIR OF MADNESS (1990). 
30. For just a few examples, see INGA CLENDINNEN, TIGER’S EYE: A MEMOIR (2002) 
(linking the inward observation of the progress of an illness with the outward observational skills of 
the historian); GEORGES  DUBY, L’HISTOIRE CONTINUE (1991) (historian whose personality emerges 
from engaging in the craft of reading documents); JACQUES LE GOFF, MY QUEST FOR THE MIDDLE 
AGES (2006) (historian responding to the politicized antiquarianism of Vichy); ERIC HOBSBAWM, 
INTERESTING TIMES: A TWENTIETH-CENTURY LIFE (2003) (historian at the nexus of contemporary 
politics); JACOB KATZ, WITH MY OWN EYES: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF AN HISTORIAN (1995) 
(historian as shaped by life experience of early life in a small village); GEORGE MOSSE, 
CONFRONTING HISTORY: A MEMOIR (2000) (explaining the significance of gay, Jewish, and 
progressive beginnings for the historian as outsider). The complex ways that historians read their own 
lives is examined in ALAIN BOUREAU, HISTOIRES D’UN HISTORIEN KANTOROWICZ (1990). 
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encouraging Freudian psychoanalysis or promoting mandatory training through 
Saint Ignatius’s spiritual exercises, it is unclear how to promote the transformation 
of the legal historical psyche. Yet without such a change, the reading of texts in a 
truly sophisticated way remains out of reach. 
Legal history has developed in its particular fashion largely because certain 
roads have not been taken. There were two particularly promising approaches that 
were missed: historical jurisprudence in the fin de siècle and the historical 
contribution to legal realism in the 1920s and 1930s. The first of these paths, 
historical jurisprudence, argued that the contingent and evolutionary 
transfiguration of past forms might have a critical influence on how we think 
about making law in our own times. F.W. Maitland brought a sense of the longue 
durée, and a willingness to ask enduring questions about the origins of liberty and 
the nature of equality.31 He embraced, rather than fled, emerging debates in 
political theory. Paul Vinogradoff brought to historical jurisprudence a 
“cosmopolitan note.”32 He divided the world of historical jurisprudence into the 
rationalists, nationalists, and evolutionists. Unlike Maitland, he brought into the 
discussion psychology, empirical investigations, and a concern with how a sense of 
rootedness influenced historical process.33 
Historical jurisprudence was an alchemical movement, turning the 
experience of history into the logic of law. In contrast to the Rawlsian dance of 
the seven (or more) veils, it does not strip human beings of their culture and past, 
but creates a radically situated subject. It was this idea of law as situated, reflecting 
community language, and consciously or unconsciously held norms, that 
prompted Oliver Wendell Holmes to claim that “the rational study of law is still to 
a large extent the study of history.”34 Historical jurisprudence held out the promise 
of culture as the defining centerpiece of law’s past. However, it also embraced less 
promising approaches. Historical jurisprudence usually conceived of law’s general 
principles as eternal, operating across time in a different fashion depending upon 
the society—but remaining forever. It identifies the unchangeable more readily 
than the changeable. And some of these unchangeable, immutable principles 
struck a discordant mystical chord of memory by evoking their national 
 
31. G.R. ELTON, F.W. MAITLAND (1985). See especially the introduction of F.W. MAITLAND, 
STATE, TRUST, AND CORPORATION, at ix–xxxix (David Runciman & Marcus Ryan eds., 2003). My 
essay, The Invention of Legal Primitivism, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRY L. 485 (2009), seeks to use 
historical jurisprudence as part of a project of recovery. Two important new works have contributed 
to the recovery of the historicist tradition in nineteenth-century American law: DAVID M. RABBAN, 
LAW’S HISTORY: AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT AND THE TRANSATLANTIC TURN TO HISTORY 
(forthcoming 2011) and KUNAL M. PARKER, COMMON LAW, HISTORY, AND DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA, 1790–1900: LEGAL THOUGHT BEFORE MODERNISM (2011). 
32. Nick O’Brien, ‘In Vino Veritas’: Truth and Method in Vinogradoff’s Historical Jurisprudence, 29 J. 
LEGAL HIST. 39, 51 (2008). 
33. 1 SIR PAUL VINOGRADOFF, OUTLINES OF HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE 1–160 (1920).  
34. JULIUS GOEBEL JR., A HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 315 
(1955). 
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particularity though such concepts as legal Volksgeist. None of this rather fuzzy 
historicism seemed to fit with an impatient, modern reading of law as science. 
With the rise of legal realism, legal historians were excluded from a much larger 
enterprise of reforming law. 
If historical jurisprudence was so soundly rejected by legal realists, might 
there be another way for legal historians to contribute to the legal realist project? 
Could they bring to bear the deeply situated, highly granular, robustly 
contextualized past—with its dense culture at once so different and so similar to 
our own—upon contemporary legal problems, and at the same time embrace 
change? Was it possible for legal historians in the golden age of legal realism to 
join a chorus that included sociology, psychoanalysis, and political economy and 
to sing its notes enunciated clearly enough so it could participate in the functional 
transformation of law into a modern regulatory system? In other words, framing 
the question for our own time, how should historians speak in a normative voice? 
During the 1920s, Julius Goebel’s course at Columbia, Development of 
Legal Institutions (DLI), constituted an attempt to situate legal texts in their 
contexts. The course was intended as a means for “repudiating the tradition which 
confined legal historical inquiry to a mere genealogy of cases.” It focused on the 
role of social sciences, “political, economic or social factors in the growth of 
particular rules or institutions.” Goebel saw law “not as an isolated phenomenon, 
but as a phase of civilization.”35 There was a real possibility of constructing a legal 
history for the age of legal realism. The DLI casebook, for example, began with 
murky beginnings of coverture but ended with the New York Married Women’s 
Property Act of 1848. Change was central to this story. As a consequence of the 
market revolution of the nineteenth century, women emerged as rights-bearing 
actors who could alienate or manage property independent of their husbands. 
Law, students should learn, is flexible, contingent, and liable to change with 
circumstances. The paternalism of common law notions of control over the 
property of wives, which marks the casebook’s endpoint, served as a lesson and a 
warning. 
Yet this moment when legal history might speak with a realist, normative 
voice disappeared almost as soon as it was conceived. If historical jurisprudence 
lost to analytic philosophy and deontological liberalism, then the historicism of 
realism might be said to have been the victim of an empirical realist turn. The 
irrelevance of history became a legacy of realism—precedent provided a dead 
weight from the past that created burdens for the recasting of a modern, outcome-
driven legal system. As legal realism abandoned history for the two-dimensional 
temptress of law and economics, legal historians turned inwards. Legal historians 
abandoned the normative project. 
The failure of legal history to seize the normative moment was in part itself a 
 
35. Id. 
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victim of historical contingency. In large part, this missed moment was due to the 
failure of Goebel’s Columbia experiment. Goebel often seemed to portray 
common law as our Roman law—filled with obscure doctrinal adherence to 
traditional common law doctrine.36 He demonstrated a penchant for creating a 
common law that was dense, full of obscure terms of art, and dry-as-dust 
interpretations of the specifically English past in an ever more global world.37 
Indeed, Goebel seems to have retreated from social historical concerns and by the 
1930s increasingly placed a premium on the particular technical knowledge of 
lawyers. Partly as a result of a dispute over how the Littleton-Griswold bequest 
should be deployed, Goebel turned against Richard Morris, who also taught in 
Columbia University at the time. Morris was a pioneering historian of colonial 
legal history with a special focus on labor law. In a devastating attack against 
Morris in the 1931 Columbia Law Review, Goebel called Morris “inept,” “naïve,” 
and “uninspired.”38 Karl Llewellyn followed up this academic mugging by calling 
Morris’s book “relentlessly botched,” and the work of a layman, not a lawyer.39  
The assault on Morris, as Christopher Tomlins has pointed out, represented 
boundary tending by lawyerly legal historians, a means of excluding those without 
formal legal training.40 Morris’s social history was cast out of the camp of real legal 
historians. This was not simply an episode where academic egotism led to clashes 
over what constitutes rigorous scholarship. Something important had occurred. 
The Goebel-Morris controversy prompted legal history turning away from deeply 
contextualized history at the very moment when the field could have embraced 
the normative project of legal realism, and when social history and textual history 
could have combined to create new common ground for understanding our legal 
past.   
III. A SHORT DICTIONARY OF MISUNDERSTOOD LEGAL HISTORICAL TERMS 
In The Unbearable Lightness of Being, Czech novelist Milan Kundera includes “a 
Short Dictionary of Misunderstood Words.” These are words seemingly shared, 
but in fact subject to multiple, often conflicting meanings by a romantic couple, 
Sabina and Franz: women, betrayal, living in truth, parades, light, and darkness. 
 
36. JULIUS GOEBEL JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL 
INSTITUTIONS (1929); John P. Dawson, Development of Law and Legal Institutions (1963) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
37. The apotheosis of common law as our Roman legal history might be found in the new 
casebook, which claims lineage from Goebel: JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENÉE LETTOW LERNER & 
BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN 
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (2009). 
38. PHILIP RANLET, RICHARD B. MORRIS AND AMERICAN HISTORY IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY 11–20 (2004); Julius Goebel Jr., King’s Law and Local Custom in Seventeenth Century New 
England, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 416 (1931). 
39. Karl Llewellyn, Law and the Modern Mind: A Symposium, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 82 (1931). 
40. Christopher Tomlins, History in the American Juridical Field: Narrative, Justification, and 
Explanation, 16 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 323 (2004). 
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According to Kundera, there is the “semantic susurrus of the river flowing” 
through this language. 41 An intimate vocabulary captures the connection between 
them. For our purposes, I will try to define a few phrases that might guide the 
relationship of legal historians to texts: The Countergenealogical Gesture, 
Palimpsest Legalism, Legal History of the Imagination, and Thin 
Normativity/Thick Normativity.  
A. The Countergenealogical Gesture 
What does it mean to operate in a countergenealogical fashion? It means to 
search for alternative paths and roads not taken, elective affinities that do not 
seem to be obvious connections. Often legal historians trace the origins of 
contemporary legal doctrine or institutions in a comfortable, linear fashion—such 
as, for example, uncovering the intellectual pedigree of federalism or the early 
modern structure of appellate actions—and, especially when it is done well, there 
is much to be gained from identifying origins. Indeed, the legal historian’s role of 
noting continuities is not a new one. Law was traditionally the keeper of both 
official codes and official pasts. In the Greek polis, public documents were kept in 
the arkheîon, which was often the home of the magistrate. Continuity, however, 
tends to replicate what Bentham called the “everything-as-it-should be”42 form of 
legalism and renders legal history the least dangerous branch of legal science. 
Law does not replicate itself naturally with one rule begetting another in 
Biblical style. Instead, laws have resonance, which can reverberate through time by 
being seized upon by others mining the past. Antiabortion activists have claimed 
kinship to the resistance of Northern nineteenth-century Americans to the 
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, which required the capture of slaves in Free States and 
the return to their masters, contrary—in the minds of many Americans—to a 
higher moral law. Antigay marriage proponents have mined the antipolygamy 
movement of a century earlier. These are examples, of course, of the Nachleben, the 
afterlife of statutes—an afterlife, which only comes into existence because later 
generations have identified threads of real or even make-believe connections. 
Genealogies are often a matter of constructing a family romance—identifying 
antecedents as an invented past. 
This focus on rupture rather than continuity has been suggested by others. 
Robert Gordon eloquently calls for  
any approach to the past that produces disturbances in the field—that 
inverts or scrambles familiar narratives of stasis, recovery or progress; 
anything that advances rival perspectives (such of those as the losers 
rather than the winners) for surveying developments, or that posits 
 
41. MILAN KUNDERA, THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF BEING 89–117 (Michael Henry 
Heim trans., 1984). 
42. 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, The Book of Fallacies, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 436, 443 
(Russell & Russell 1962) (1843). 
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alternative trajectories that might have produced a very different 
present—in short any approach that unsettles the familiar strategies that 
we use to tame the past in order to normalize the present.43 
But the countergenealogical gesture is not just about undoing existing 
narratives. It also means the constructing of new narratives across time in order to 
challenge familiar claims of legitimacy grounded upon the transmission of legal 
ideas from one generation to the next. 
B. Palimpsest Legalism 
To borrow a psychoanalytic term, which was in turn borrowed from art 
history, if you peel off one layer of history on a canvas, another might be 
discovered underneath. This section will discuss the methods that might be used 
to strip away one past to see another. Here is how Freud identifies the palimpsest: 
[S]uppose that Rome is not a human habitation but a psychical entity 
with a similarly long and copious past—an entity, that is to say, in which 
nothing that has once come into existence will have passed away, and all 
the earlier phases of development continue to exist alongside the latest 
one.44 
We can peel away existing pasts and discover beneath them surprising 
hidden pasts. Take the classic question of tracing the beginnings of British North 
America’s legal and constitutional order. The received tradition is one of 
settlement, grants of authority from the Crown, and the establishment of legal 
institutions such as courts and legislatures. Such a narrative hands down legal 
authority in the fashion of an apostolic succession. The monarch and his chartered 
agents, Parliament and its courts are repositories of the legalities of early 
America—and these, ultimately, would be transfigured in the final succession into 
a new American constitutional order for the ages.   
Yet among the earliest legal codes of the postencounter New World were 
those written by buccaneers and utopians. Pirates established direct democracies 
with equal voting rights and equal shares in the booty.45 Their regulations, binding 
and difficult-to-change charters, framed in wooden, seaborne worlds, spoke to the 
different sorts of hierarchies made possible by leaving Europe. What does it mean 
that New World constitutionalism might have its origins between the devil and the 
deep blue sea? 
Or, perhaps, America’s legal tradition begins in the aspirations of Europe. 
Before actual legal structures were created, however, they were imagined. For 
some, like Thomas More, the New World was a place where “all things grew 
 
43. Robert W. Gordon, The Arrival of Critical Historicism, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1023, 1024 (1997). 
44. SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION, SOCIETY AND RELIGION: GROUP PSYCHOLOGY, 
CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS AND OTHER WORKS 257 (James Strachey trans., 1985). 
45. PETER T. LEESON, THE INVISIBLE HOOK: THE HIDDEN ECONOMICS OF PIRATES 175 
(2009). 
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milder, the air less burning, the soil more verdant, and even the beasts were less 
wild.”46 In such an environment, it might be possible to experiment with new 
forms of governance. More’s Utopia, Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis, and James 
Harrington’s Commonwealth of Oceana all reflected the impact of envisioning new 
worlds founded upon theories of legal governance. Francis Bacon’s island is 
governed by a charter that limits the commonwealth’s intercourse with the outside 
world. Knowledge is gathered from the far corners of the globe by carefully 
selected emissaries sent by the collegiate Solomon’s House, and which is housed 
in a variety of galleries. Limiting public knowledge is core to the suppression of 
luxury and vice.47 Distance and self-consciousness, attributed as a literary conceit 
to the New World, allows the New Atlantis to flourish. Oceana, too, is a marvelous 
island commonwealth. The orders of Harrington’s imagined society mediate 
between a small aristocracy and an informed populace.  
Peel away the ordered written federal constitutionalism of today with its 
separation of powers, densely parsed clauses, and sparse amendments, and one 
can find earlier origins for America—the state constitutions of the late eighteenth-
century described by Gordon Wood, for example, in The Creation of the American 
Republic. Peel off another layer and there is the swashbuckling constitutionalism of 
pirates, attempts to impose order on property and social relations at the edge of 
empire. Peel off still one more layer, and there lie the new world utopian visions 
of More, Bacon, and Harrington.  
C. Legal History of the Imagination 
Often by definition, a legal text is a text because it is official—created by the 
arbiters of legal authority: legislatures and councils, judicial figures, monarchs, and 
constitutional conventions. This is a kind of Austinian positivism adopted by legal 
historians. As John Austin defined law, it is a “rule set by men,” a command of a 
superior to an inferior with sanctions for noncompliance—or, in short, a bark 
with a bite.48 The purpose of such a definition was to provide a description of 
what law excludes as a category. Law emphatically was not custom, natural law, 
divine normative interventions, or the embodiment of justice in rules. Law was 
seen as a hegemonic power of the state.  
In fact, however, a great deal of law has been made outside of official legal 
boundaries: imaginary punishments, mock execution, parodic statutes, stillborn 
reform proposals, and fabular narratives about how law came into being. Law is 
often envisioned, formulated, and represented as a cultural artifact by a wide array 
 
46. SIR THOMAS MOORE, UTOPIA 3 (Ronald Herder ed., Dover Publications unabr. ed. 1997) 
(1516). 
47. SIR FRANCIS BACON, ESSAYS AND NEW ATLANTIS 272 (Gordon S. Haight ed., Classic 
Club 1942) (1521–1626). 
48. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (Wilfrid E. Rumble 
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1832). 
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of historical actors, including the common people, independent of government’s 
power to command and punish.49 This might be called the legal history of the 
imagination. 
Take, for example, a 1785 proposal I found some years ago in the Public 
Record Office in London. It was a plan for transporting English felons to the 
banks of the Gambia River in West Africa, which was intended to address the 
crisis prompted by the American Revolution ending North America as the site of 
convict transportation. Insalubrious prisons and hulks—ships moored in the 
Thames Estuary or Plymouth Harbor—were bursting at the seams. Where would 
convicted British criminals now be sent? The author, an ordinary citizen, pointed 
out that mortality rates differed radically according to the length of the river with 
the closest section to the coast being the healthiest and the furthest part of the 
river inland being the most dangerous. This observation, probably based upon 
actual evidence from the slave trade, would be used to punish in proportion to the 
severity of the crime. Murderers would be placed, for example, in the least 
salubrious territory, while those disciplined for less brutal offenses might live near 
the Gambia’s headwaters. What was so intriguing was that proportionality had just 
recently been introduced as a basic principle for criminology, most notably in 
Cesare Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments.50 Determining precisely how to 
measure out pain, to create a new calculus of punishment, was only beginning to 
be worked out and only later would be inscribed in official criminal law statutes.51 
Law might be made out of myth. Indeed, legal historians must free 
themselves from the shackles of a kind of historical positivism—Leopold von 
Ranke’s wie es eigentlich gewesen ist—this is as it actually was—as well as legal 
positivism. French medievalist Alain Boureau, for example, shows how one of the 
best known laws of the Middle Ages, the jus primae noctis, the right of the feudal 
lord to have sexual relations with the bride of a vassal on her wedding night, was, 
in fact, an exceedingly well-circulated myth.52 Robert Tsai is currently working on 
a project identifying a collection of constitutions, “America’s Forgotten 
Constitutions,” written by citizens as diverse as nineteenth-century utopians, from 
John Brown’s followers to twentieth-century white supremacists.53 Elsewhere, I 
have shown how Jewish legal commentators constructed an entire alternative 
 
49. STEVEN WILF, LAW’S IMAGINED REPUBLIC: POPULAR POLITICS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 7 (2010). 
50. CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND OTHER WRITINGS (Richard 
Bellamy ed., 1995). 
51. Report from the Committee on Transportation to Africa (May 9, 1785) (Public Record 
Office, London, H0432/6); Steven Wilf, Imagining Justice: Aesthetics and Public Executions in Late 
Eighteenth-Century England, 5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 51 (1993). 
52. ALAIN BOUREAU, LE DROIT DE CUISSAGE: LA FABRICATION D’UN MYTHE (XIIIE-XXE 
SIÈCLE) (1995). 
53. ROBERT TSAI, DEFIANT DESIGNS: AMERICA’S FORGOTTEN CONSTITUTIONS 
(forthcoming 2012). 
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universe of pre-Sinai law in order to pose the jurisprudential possibility of a 
legalism more oral, more customary, more discretionary, and more concerned with 
the psychological question of how a norm-bearing person might be created 
outside of the blunt obligations imposed by a divine law-giving moment.54 
In other words, imaginary law might be mimetic borrowing of official legal 
forms—such as Tsai’s constitutions; a canvas for trying out new ideas and 
challenging the legal status quo—such as pre-Sinai law; or even vested with its 
own normative power. Providing an example of imagined law with normative 
purchase, E.P. Thompson famously and controversially showed how the ritual sale 
or exchange of a wife substituted for the absence of divorce among the common 
people in nineteenth-century England.55 Even more intriguingly, imaginary law 
might be used to construct over-arching narratives that might replace our 
traditional stories about legal origins. 
D. Thin Normativity/Thick Normativity  
Thin normativity is the usual kind practiced in the rarified atmosphere of law 
reviews: change the following provision to provide for a different outcome. Thick 
normativity is the shifting of lenses. What happens to the way contract doctrine 
might be constructed if an historian unearths evidence of equitable considerations 
in an earlier period? What does it mean for contemporary law if the private/public 
distinction only emerges in its present-day form late in the nineteenth century? 
How important is the fact that transparency was a central feature of late criminal 
punishment in the period of the American Revolution? Thick normativity 
identifies the role of the legal historian to reorient the viewer. If as Marcel Proust 
once said, a voyage of discovery consists not in seeking new landscapes but in 
having new eyes, how can legal historical work provide glimpses of alternative 
worlds? Thick normativity is an arrow directing the is/ought distinction firmly in 
the direction of the ought. 
IV. BLAKE’S TELESCOPE 
According to William Blake, the problem with the telescope is that it alters 
“the ratio of the spectator’s organs but leave objects untouch’d.”56 Legal history 
shares this optic. Filing and reorganizing text in neat narrative categories, 
sometimes describing continuities and other times focusing upon rupture, legal 
historians magnify the microcosm of legal documents. They chart the 
constellations of how the documents are related to change. When the documents 
do not fit together, they readily adopt all sorts of legerdemain to force them into a 
 
54. STEVEN WILF, THE LAW BEFORE THE LAW, at xiii (2008). 
55. E.P. THOMPSON, The Sale of Wives, in CUSTOMS IN COMMON 404, 404–07 (1991). 
56. 1 WILLIAM BLAKE, THE POETICAL WORKS OF WILLIAM BLAKE 496 (Edwin Ellis ed., 
1906). 
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pattern. However, legal historians less commonly are willing to dissect texts, 
plumb their multiple meanings, and—in a sense doing violence to the text—
operate on them to reassemble legal expression in order to show their inherent 
possible meanings. The butter knife, not the scalpel, has been their favorite 
instrument. They often shy away from the essential tasks of lawyers—close 
reading and seeking social change—and remain coiled up in their comfortable 
academic niches. As scholars, legal historians have proved more at ease with a 
distant vision than with tangible normative proposals. The object has too often 
remained untouched. 
Since this Essay sings the praises of thick normativity, let me conclude with a 
normative or, at least, prescriptive summation. I have tried to strike a path midway 
between two frequently taken roads in discussions about historians and their 
work, and to apply these to the ways we might think about the future of legal 
history. On the one hand, we should be more self-conscious about methodology 
than merely reasserting the centrality of craft. Of course, there is the historian’s 
Boy Scout Code of Honor: we must be careful with sources, pursue facts 
diligently, recognize the contributions of others, hone a finely attuned intuitive 
sense of the political and social culture of a period, cultivate felicitous rhetoric, 
and always keep in mind the mantra of change over time. But métier should not 
mean that we embrace a vow of theoretical impoverishment. 
On the other hand, we cannot turn into the young and the restless, a James 
Dean (Rebel without a Scholarly Pause) sort of academic discipline always cruising 
down the road in search of the next big methodological approach. After the social 
history turn came the cultural anthropological turn, then came the linguistic turn, 
and, finally, the global turn, which took the road into the borderlands, past 
subalterns, and across boundaries. After all these turns, is it any wonder that we 
are experiencing a sense of intellectual vertigo? 
No doubt, some legal historians will keep waiting for the next big paradigm. 
Will it be a classic cross-field borrowing (cultural anthropology, literary 
historicism) or a recent French import (Bourdieu’s habitus for humanity)? Or 
simply a shift of subject matter (the history of emotions or everyday life)? While 
those seeking a new paradigm might consult Gordon’s pocket guide to the exotic 
varieties of legal historical approaches, an even greater temptation is to reach for a 
do-it-yourself methodological tool kit. Rummaging about for methodologies, 
however, is no more satisfying than the search for an off-the-rack suit without any 
sort of measurement whatsoever. Will “law as . . .”—with its close textual 
reading—be any more of an agreeable paradigm than “law and . . . .”? 
I have argued that we somehow have to bridge the distance between the legal 
text as a situs of interpretation and the legal text as a technology of power. We 
need to recognize that every legal text reflects a fundamental tension. True, texts 
are chimerical, opening up all sorts of alternative possibilities. But, as I stated, this 
can lead to a sense of text sickness, a sense of vertigo as the text becomes an 
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increasingly slippery place to stand. Perhaps the antidote is that we also have a 
history of reading texts that limits possible interpretations. Many of the 
approaches I discussed in A Short Dictionary of Misunderstood Terms were 
mechanisms to work through the problem posed by mixing overly mutable texts 
with overly rigid forms of reading. Countergenealogical gestures create alternative 
narratives. Palimpsest Legalism provides a method for archeological digging to 
show how one past effaces another. Imaginary law takes us to the full palette of 
legal thinking—looking at law as envisioned as well as real legal rules with real 
sanctions. All of these ways of reading demand ordering, disciplining texts into 
patterns, structures—and, ultimately, into normative possibilities. We must answer 
the legal realist question, asked when legal realists still saw history as a possible 
handmaid to legal change: what does the legal past inform the legal future?  
This Essay insists that the demand for normative readings of law’s past 
comes from the particular ways that legal historians must read purposeful legal 
texts. As suggested, we failed to take advantage of the possibilities posed by 
historical jurisprudence and legal realism of a normative turn to history, and we 
have often sidestepped the sort of creative methodologies posed in A Short 
Dictionary of Misunderstood Legal Historical Terms. We are compelled by using the 
very methods that would best probe the deeper meanings lurking within statutes, 
cases, and imagined legal texts to craft normative responses to those texts. There 
is no reason, as the metaphor of Blake’s telescope suggests, that the optic of legal 
text reading has to embrace a flight from engaging in the larger project of 
proposing changes in inherited legal rules. Galileo’s observatory tower in Padua 
looks remarkably like the turret of a Renaissance palazzo, reaching to the sky. It 
has all the hubris of the fortified home of a Florentine or Venetian patrician. The 
soaring height, the square observation point sitting aloft a narrow redbrick turret, 
and the decorative carving of the buttresses—all this bespeaks a raw assertion of 
power. If a Renaissance artist wished to depict the Tower of Babel, he or she need 
not proceed any further. Imagine this structure in Galileo’s own time. Within this 
battlement stands a figure squinting through a small brass telescope. The lenses 
are scratched, the length of the brass tube extends barely an arm’s length into the 
heavens—and the object remains untouched. His text is the arrangement of the 
stars on the evening’s dusky canvas. Has he forced the heavens to yield another 
one of its secrets? But Galileo has come to recognize a more important truth: 
observation is simply the beginning of heresy. 
 
 
 
 
